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NOTES
prejudicial delay os on the part of the other co-tenants in offering to
contribute to the expense of the tax title after having received notice
of the purchase and of the exclusive claim of the purchasing co-tenant 6 4
is regarded as an abandonment of their right to share in the benefits
of the tax title.6 5 The decisions on this subject reflect a strong inclina-
tion on the part of the courts to place great emphasis on the equities of
each case. In doing so, the courts of equity are exercising no more than
their traditional prerogative to deal with each case as gbod conscience
and morality require.
MILToN D. JoNms
SOUND AMPLIFIERS: NUISANCE OR FREE SPEECH?
A problem facing every municipality in the nation is that of the regu-
lation of loud-speaking devices.' Congested living conditions following
upon the rapid growth of urban populations bring into increasing im-
portance the problem of controlling the use of mechanical sound ampli-
fiers to prevent aural aggression.
A conflict develops between the individual's constitutional right of
free speech 2 and the interest of the community, coupled with the citi-
La. 957,.142 So. 138 (1932); Doiron v. Lock, M. & Co., 165 La. 57, 115 So. 366
(1927); Duson v. Roos, 123 La. 835, 49 So. 590 (1909); Gulf Refining Co. v.
Hart, 130 La. 51, 57 So. 581 (1912); Egan v. Egan, 98 N. 3. Eq. 487, 131 AUt.
129 (1925).
"Peabody v. Burni, 755 IML 592, 99 N. E. 690 (1912) (delay of 20 years but no
prejudice shown); cf. Buchanan v. King's Heirs, 22 Gratt. 414 (Va. 1872).
"Inman v. Quirey, 128 Ark. 605, 194 S. W. 858 (1917); Stone v. Marshall, 52
Wash. 375, 100 Pac. 858 (1909).
"In Spencer v. Spencer, 36 So.2d 424 (Fla. 1948), this important phase of the
case was not discussed even though there had been a 17-year lapse from the pur-
chase of tax title to the time of suit. Undoubtedly the land bad greatly increased
in value, and it was alleged that plaintiff had spent considerable sums for improve-
ments. However, it did not appear whether defendants had ever been informed
of plaintiff's tax title or his exclusive claim under it. Unless these facts were
present, the circumstances strongly suggest that the defendants were guilty of laches.
'NAT. INs'. o Mu '. LAw Omxcns, Rep. No. 123, p. 3 (1948).
1U. S. Comsr. Amend. I; U. S. CoxsT. Amend. XIV, §1; Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U. S. 319 (1937); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353 (1937).
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zen's right to peace and quiet. 3 It is well settled that the constitutional
freedoms are not absolute rights.4 Although they are placed in a pre-
ferred position,5 the rights are relative 6 and must be exercised in sub-
ordination to the general comfort and convenience and in consonance
with peace and good order. 7 On the other hand, the state's power of
regulation must not be used merely as a guise to abridge or deny the
rights.8 The difficulty arises in applying these general principles to a
given factual situation and in determining on which side the scales are
balanced. Indicative of the difficulty are the numerous decisions by a di-
vided United States Supreme Court in recent cases involving the free-
doms.9 The trend is toward favoring the personal freedoms of speech,
religion, and the press at the expense of the individual's rights to peace
and quiet.'o This conflict and the current trend are graphically illns-
trated in a recent case.
'Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940); Kovacs v. Cooper, 135 N. J. L.
584, 52 A.2d 806 (1947).
'E.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158 (1944); Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353 (1937); Gitlow v.
People of New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925).
'Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501 (1946); Follett v. Town of McCormick,
321 U. S. 573 (1944); West Virginia State Board of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624
(1943); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141 (1943); Bridges v. California,
314 U. S. 252 (1941); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U. S. 147 (1939); Woolf v.
Fuller, 87 N. H. 64, 174 At. 193 (1934).
'Cases cited note 5 supra; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516 (1945); Carpen-
ters & Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U. S. 722 (1942); West Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937).
'See note 4 supra.
8
U. S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, §1; Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105
(1943) ; Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S. 413 (1943) ; Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U. S.
147 (1939); Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496 (1939); People v. Banks, 168 Misc. 515,
6 N. Y. S.2d 41 (1938).
'Tucker v. Texas, 326 U. S. 517 (1946); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501
(1946); Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U. S. 573 (1944); Prince v. Massachu-
setts, 321 U. S. 158 (1944); West Virginia State Board of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S.
624 (1943); Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U. S. 157 (1943); Martin v. City of
Struthers, 319 U. S. 141 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 (1943);
Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S. 413 (1943); Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U. S.
584 (1942); Carpenters & Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U. S. 722 (1942);
In re Summers, 325 U. S. 561 (1941); Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252 (1941);
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U. S. 147
(1939); Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496 (1939); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319
(1937).
"0Cases cited note 9 suPra; Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U. S. 583 (1943); Lax-
2
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NOTES
I. THE Saia CASE
In Saia v. People of New York, 1 ' a municipal ordinance' 2 of the
city of Lockport, New York, prohibited for most purposes the use of
loud-speakers in the city streets and public places. An exception was
made for dissemination of news items, matters of public concern. and
athletic activities, provided a permit was first obtained from the chief
of police. Pursuant to the ordinance, defendant Saia, a member of the
religious sect commonly known as Jehovah's Witnesses, was given per-
mission to operate a sound truck in a public park on four successive Sun-
days, and he, in fact, so operated the machine on those days. His fifth
application was denied because of numerous complaints, but he never-
theless proceeded to operate his sound truck without a permit. He was
convicted of violating the ordinance. 13 The United States Supreme
Court reversed the conviction, four justices dissenting.
The Court held that Section 3 of the ordinance, requiring a permit
before operation in the excepted case, was unconstitutional on its face,
since it establishcd . previous restraint on the right of free speech in
violation of the First Amendment, protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment against state action. Further objection to the constitutionality of
the ordinance were these: no standards were established for limiting the
official's discretionary power; the ordinance was an unlawful delegation
of the legislative function; it was a possible instrument of oppression;
gent v. Texas, 318 U. S. 418 (1943); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568
(1942); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1938); West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353 (1937).
168 Sup. Ct. 1148 (1948).
"The Lockport ordinance, insofar as pertinent, reads as follows: "Section 2.
Radio devices, etc.- It shall be unlawful for any person to maintain and operate
in any building, or on any premises or on any automobile, motor truck or other
motor vehicle, any radio device, mechanical device, or loud speaker or any device
of any kind whereby the sound therefrom is cast directly upon the streets and public
places and where such device is maintained for advertising purposes or for the purpose
of attracting the attention of the passing public, or which is so placed and operated
that the sounds coming therefrom can be heard to the annoyance or inconvenience
of travelers upon any street or public places or of persons in neighboring premises.
"Section 3.-Exception.-Public dissemination, through radio, loudspeakers, of
items of news and matters of public concern and athletic activities shall not be
deemed a violation of this section provided that the same be done under permission
obtained from the Chief of Police."
1People v. Saia, 297 N. Y. 659, 76 N. E.2d 323 (1947).
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and it contained all the vices of those in the Cantwell, Hague, and Lov-
ell'4 cases.
On the basis of the Saia decision the present law in regard to the regu-
lation of loud-speakers may be broadly stated to forbid any ordinance
related to freedom of speech from vesting discretionary authority in a
public official without setting forth clearly defined standards. Accord-
ingly, municipalities are prohibited from reposing in a minor official
absolute discretion in granting or denying a permit to use loud-speaking
devices, since these mechanisms are connected, to some extent at least,
with freedom of speech.
I. POWER OF PROHIBITION AND REGULATION
The Court in the Saia case failed to pass on the validity of Section 2
of the ordinance, which completely prohibited for most purposes the use
of loud-speaking devices. It was on the basis of this section that Saia
was convicted rather than on the basis of Section 3, which permitted ex-
ceptions. The Court looked to the entire ordinance, however, in order
to see whether any part of it could be construed as unconstitutional. 15
In the New Jersey case of Kovacs v. Cooperl an evenly divided
state court sustained the defendant's conviction under an ordinance of
the city of Trenton prohibiting completely the use of all sound trucks or
loud-speaking devices. The defendant had set a sound amplifier on a
truck and, while driving on a Trenton street, had played music and
"In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940), it was held that a conviction
for breach of the peace violated religious liberty when the offense was merely that
of attempting to induce individuals to listen to phonograph records attacking their
religion, thereby provoking their indignation. In Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496
(1939), the Court struck down an ordinance requiring a permit for the use of streets
or parks for public assembly and enabling the director of safety to refuse a permit
on his mere opinion that such refusal would prevent riots, disturbances, or disorderly
assemblage. This case was not heard by the full Court. In Lovell v. City of Griffin,
303 U. S. 444 (1938), a city ordinance forbade, as a nuisance, the distribution of
literature of any kind without the written permission of the city manager. A
Jehovah's Witness disregarded the ordinance and was convicted. The Court held that
the pamphlets distributed were in the nature of religious tracts and that, since there
were no limitations on the city manager's authority, the ordinance violated the Four-
teenth Amendment.
"Tj£his attitude in the "freedoms" cases is an exception to the usual canon that
legislation should be upheld if possible. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S.
379 (1937).
1013S N. J. L. 584, S2 Aid 806 (1947).
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spoken through the amplifier. It was indicated that the purpose of the
speech was to comment on an existing labor dispute in the community.
This case is pending before the United States Supreme Court, and the
decision may well settle the question, which is still open, as to whether
a municipality may constitutionally prohibit the use of all loud-speaking
devices.
Although this point was not decided in the Saia case, the majority
opinion connotes that religion is in such a preferred position that a mu-
nicipality cannot entirely prohibit the use of sound equipment in the
propagation of religious ideas in public places.
In the Saia case the Court failed to distinguish between sound itself
and the dissemination of ideas; the decisions agree that a municipality
may in some respects restrict the broadcast of sound in public places,
as, for example, music played on records from a music emporium' 7 onto
the street. This is analogous to the instant case, since the ordinance
in the Saia case was designed to restrict sound itself rather than the dis-
semination of religious ideas. Although it is generally held that such dis-
semination may not be restricted or curtailed,' 8 as Justice Frankfurter
pointed out in his dissenting opinion, this does not mean that the public
must be forced to listen. 9 Unbounded aural aggression in the name of
freedom of speech is a pernicious doctrine. The right to speak is one
thing; a right to force someone to listen is quite another. If the consti-
tutional right of freedom of speech contemplates only the native power
of the human voice, the right of free speech and the right to peace and
quiet are evenly balanced. A person may spread his ideas by word of
mouth: one who chooses to listen may come within earshot of the speak-
er; one who chooses not to listen may move out of range of the speaker's
voice. In cases of freedom of the press, those who do not choose to read
need not have their attention bludgeoned by undesired reading matter.
20
"Stodder v. Rosen Talking Machine Co., 241 Mass. 245, 135 N. E. 251 (1922),
Judgment of contempt for violating the decree affd, 247 Mass. 60, 141 N. E. 569
(1923) ; Giebough v. West Side Amusement Co., 64 N. J. Eq. 27, 53 At. 289 (1902);
Peters v. Moses, 171 Misc. 441, 12 N. Y. S.2d 735 (1939).
" E.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501 (1946); Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U. S.
583 (1943); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S. 413 (1943); Martin v. City of Struthers,
319 U. S. 141 (1943).
1'Saia v. People, 68 Sup. Ct. 1148, 1151 (1948).
"'It is with this in mind that such ordinances as the one in Lowell v. City of
Griffin, supra note 14, are held to be unconstitutional. Although Tucker v. Texas,
326 U. S. 517 (1946), and Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501 (1946), held that Jehov-
ah's Witnesses could not be prevented from distributing their pamphlets on private
5
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Consequently there is no appreciable aggression by one right on the other.
If, under certain circumstances, the public should wish to hear a specific
program, a religious sermon, or a news item, it might be desirable to am-
plify the sound by a mechanical device in some specific locations; but
the determination of the existence of such circumstances is of necessity a
discretionary matter, difficult to provide for by definite standards in a
statute or ordinance.
The Court failed to consider the distinction between the regulation of
sound itself and control of mechanical sound equipment on public prop-
erty. Mr. Justice Jackson stated in his dissenting opinion, "It is astonish-
ing news to me if the Constitution prohibits a municipality from policing,
controlling or forbidding erection of such equipment by a private party
in a public park." 2 1 A city may regulate the use of its streets in setting
up equipment in derogation of public safety.2 2 While there may well be
some factual distinction between protection of public safety in city streets
and limitation of disagreeable noises in city parks, the Court could prop-
erly have sustained the conviction of Saia on the narrow issue of a mu-
nicipality'.s power to prohibit or regulate the setting up of physical sound
equipment on its public property.23 The opposite decision accordingly
indicates that freedom of propagandizing religion is in a category so fa-
vored that a municipality is helpless against the use of sound equipment,
even on city-owned property. As against this extreme conclusion, the
unguided discretion reposed in the chief of police may be regarded as
the true basis for the decision.
property, the factual situations were peculiar in that the private property was a
company-owned town in the Marsh case and federal property in the Tucker case.
These holdings do not embrace private property in its generally accepted sense.
Furthermore, even though distribution of the pamphlets could not be hindered, no one
was forced to read them. Amplified sound, however, is not readily disregarded,
even when one resents it.
alSaia v. People, 68 Sup. Ct. 1148, 1153 (1948).
"Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S. 413 (1943); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569
(1941); City Council v. Jackson, 20 Ga. App. 710, 93 S. E. 304 (1917).
"In Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 39 N. E. 113 (1895), aff'd, 167 U. S.
43 (1897), Chief Justice Holmes gave the following opinion: "It is, therefore, conclu-
sively determined there was no right in the plaintiff in error to use the Common
except in such mode and subject to such regulations as the legislature in its wisdom
may have deemed proper to prescribe. The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States does not destroy the power of the states to enact police
regulations as to subjects within their control.. . . and does not have the effect of
creating a particular and personal right in the citizen to use public property in de-
fiance of the Constitution and laws of the State." The United States Supreme Court
has often distinguished but never overruled this case.
6
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An interesting sidelight to the legalistic approach to these problems
is that in cases involving the freedoms the dispute invariably concerns
religious, labor, or political minority groups whose ideas are frequently
repugnant to those of the vast majority of the public. 2 4 The coqits are
determining the extent to which the propagation of these ideas, by natural
and artificial means, can be controlled under the Constitution.
Another point in rather sharp conflict among the justices in the Saia
case is whether the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance is to be
tested by the factual situation as it actualy exists in a given case,2 5 or,
as the Court decided here, by any conceivable circumstances that might
arise thereunder. Coupled with this is the fact that the Supreme Court
has repeatedly held that there is a presumption in favor of the constitu-
tionality of a statute.2 6 The greater number of past decisions hold that
the constitutionality of a statute27 should be decided on the basis of the
instant factual situation. 28 The reasoning is fairly evident: one of the
principles used in determining the constitutionality of a law is that al-
most any legal rule, if subjected to a reductio ad absurdum, can be con-
strued so as to operate, under some imagined factual situations, in an
unconstitutional manner.
Under the admitted factual situation in the Saia case, it is evident
that the defendant's constitutional rights were not in fact impaired.29
Saia had already spoken in the park on four successive Sundays. In view
of the fact that during only three months of the year are the parks in the
North suitable for use in their normal recreational aspect, and that there
are more than 250 recognized religious denominations in the United
"See note 10 supra.
"Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926); Stuart Lindsley
v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61 (1911).
"Alabama State Fed. of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U. S. 450 (1945); Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940); Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 302 U.S.
319 (1937); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 358 (1926); Gitlow v. People, 268 U. S.
652 (1925); Stuart Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61 (1911).
"A municipal ordinance is a "statute" of the state, within the meaning of JunicrAL
CODE §237(a). King Mfg. Co. v. Augusta, 277 U S. 100 (1928).
"E.g., Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U. S. 405 (1935); State Board
of Tax Comm'rs v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527 (1931); Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926); Cady v. Detroit, 289 Mich. 499, 286 N. W. 805
(1939), appeal dismissed, 309 U. S. 620 (1940).
"The burden of proof as to showing injury is upon the party attacking the con-
stitutionality of a statute. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619 (1937); United States
v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1 (1936).
7
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States, Saia was allotted more than a fair proportion of the available
time. No evidence was presented showing that any other denomination
had ever been permitted or had requested to hold meetings in this area
of the park, which was essentially for recreational purposes. The park
was financed by the citizens of the community, not by any religious sect.
Evidence was wholly lacking that the action of the chief of police was in
fact arbitrary or capricious.
III. LATITUDE OF DISCRETION ALLOWED
There is also the point, disregarded by the Court, that "such laws
may also find their justification in the fact that, in some fields, the bad
fades into the good by such insensible degrees that the two are not
capable of being readily distinguished and separated in terms of legis-
lation." 3 0  This is particularly true of statutes involving nuisances.
On established principles of constitutional law, to hold unconstitutional
a statute exercising the police power, the court should find that it bears
no substantial relation to public welfare, health, protection, or privacy,
or that it is patently excessive. 3 1 This principle rests on the concept
that the decision as to whether a given course of conduct is a nuisance
should rest with those who have to live with it. If there is any reason-
able basis for the statute or ordinance, it should be sustained; 3 2 the
court should not substitute its judgment for that of the elected represen-
tatives of the people.
3 3
The Saia decision with regard to the requirement of clearly defined
standards in ordinances is based on a principle illustrated in the leading case
"
0
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 389 (1926).
"Madden v. Commonwealth, 309 U. S. 83 (1940); Hall v. Putney, 291 Ill. App.
508, 10 N. E.2d 204 (1937); O'Connor v. Aluminum Ore Co., 224 fI1. App. 613.
(1922); Russell Inv. Corp. v. Russell, 182 Miss. 385, 182 So. 102 (1938); Williams v.
Cross, 16 Tenn. App. 454, 65 S. W.2d 198 (1932).
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 30C U. S. 379 (1937) ; Stephenson v. Binford,
287 U. S. 251 (1932); State Board of Tax Comm'rs v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527 (1931);
Gitlow v. People, 268 U. S. 652 (1925).
"'Polish Nat. Alliance v. N. L. R. B., 322 U. S. 643 (1944). Whether a particular
grant of authority to an officer or agency is wise or unwise raises questions which
are of no concern to the Supreme Court. Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503
(1944); Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. Western Reference & Bond Ass'n, 313 U. S.
236 (1941); South Carolina State Hwy. Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U. S.
177 (1938); Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U. S. 251 (1932).
8
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of Seignious v. Rice.3 ' In cases involving zoning ordinances3 5 or licens-
ing of plumbers,3 8 barbers, 3 7 doctors,3 8 attorneys at law,3 9 or loco-
motive engineers, 4 0 the standard can in practice be clearly defined by
the legislature, so as to limit strictly the discretion vested in the enforce-
ment officer. It would be an unauthorized delegation of the legislative
function to delegate to a minor official the duty of determining whether
or not a man is fit to practice medicine, law, or other occupations unless
standards are prescribed on which he is to base his decision. 4'
In the field of nuisances, however, encompassing such problems as
smoke,42 , dust,4a vibrations,44 gases,45 odors,48 and sound47 the test
of the existence of a nuisance is necessarily one of reasonableness in
regard to the individual and community.48 Since guiding regulations
cannot be set down with the precision of a mathematical formula,4 9
"'The Legislature cannot grant to an administrative officer plenary power to dis-
criminate between applicants, requiring some to prove their fitness and granting a
license- to others witbou;Z ,rh proof." Seignious v. Rice, 273 N. Y. 44, 6 N. E.2d 91,
93 (1936).
"'Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926).
"6See note 34 supra; 11 Amr JuR. 1053.
"'State v. Briggs, 45 Ore. 366, 78 Pac. 361 (1904); see Note 98, A. L. R. 1090
(1935).
3841 Am. Jua. 138.
"In re Galusba, 184 Cal. 697, 195 Pac. 406 (1921); 5 Am. JuR. 277.
"Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Alabama, 128 U. S. 96 (1888); Smith v. Alabama,
124 U. S. 465 (1888).
'"Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1938); A. L. A. Schecter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388
(1935); see notes 35-40 supra.
"fDe Blois v. Bowers, 44 F.2d 621 (D. C. Mass. 1930); Kolb v. Knoxville, 111
Tenn. 311, 76 S. W. 823 (1903).
"Centoni v. Ingalls, 113 Cal. App. 192, 298 Pac. 47 (1931); Graham v. Ridge, 41
Ohio App. 288, 179 N. E. 693 (1931).
"McCullen v. Jennings, 141 Kan. 420, 41 P.2d 753 (1935).
"'See note 42 supra.
"Shellabarger v. Morris, 115 Mo. App. 566, 91 S. W. 1005 (1905); Swanson v.
Bradshaw, 187 S. W. 268 (1916).
'7 Warren Co. v. Dickson, 185 Ga. 481, 195 S. E. 568 (1938); McGill v. Pintsch
Compressing Co., 140 Iowa 429, 118 N. W. 786 (1908).
"GA. CODE §§72-101 (1933), Warren Co. v. Dickson, 185 Ga. 481, 195 S. E.
568 (1938); Higgins v. Decorah Produce Co., 214 Iowa 276, 242 N. W. 109 (1932).
"In discussing the relationship between the guaranties of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and the police power of the states, Chief Justice Holmes has-pointed out: "We
9
Benson and Resnick: Sound Amplifiers: Nuisance or Free Speech?
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1949
112 UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
determining reasonableness entails the vesting of a greater latitude of
discretion in minor officials. In certain sparsely populated locales sound
may not be unreasonable, whereas in heavily populated areas the same
sound is unreasonable and therefore a nuisance. Any rules must of
necessity be flexible in order to meet varying situations. It has accord-
ingly been held, in cases involving the determination of what constitutes
a nuisance, that the granting of broad discretion to a minor official or
administrative officer is not an unlawful delegation of the legislative
function. 5 0
Assuming that standards for regulating a nuisance caused by sound
could be set down by an engineer with any degree of certainty by stating
the number of decibels 5 ' allowable, it is difficult to apply this basis of
measurement to sound amplification, and those enforcing the ordinance
would probably be confused. Furthermore, the volume needed changes
under different conditions and situations; a purely mechanical test
does not serve in defining a nuisance.
must be cautious about pressing the broad words of the Fourteenth Amendment to a
drily logical extreme. Many laws which it would be vain to ask the court to
overthrow could be shown, easily enough, to transgress a scholastic interpretation of
one or another of the great guaranties in the Bill of Rights. They more or less limit
the liberty of the individual, or they diminish property to a certain extent. We have
few scientifically certain criteria of legislation, and as it is often difficult to mark
the line where what is called the police power of the states is limited by the Consti-
tution of the United States, judges should be slow to read into the latter a nomulus
tnutare as against the lawmaking power." Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S.
104, 110 (1911). See note 48 supra.
"0Northwestern Laundry v. Des Moines, 239 U. S. 486 (1916) (ordinance upheld
providing that the emission of dense smoke could be prohibited if the city commis-
sion determined it was a nuisance) ; Ryder v. Board of Health, 273 Mass. 177, 173 N.
E. 580 (1930) (order of the Board of Health sustained, prohibiting plaintiff's piggery
under the statute which empowered the Board to remove all nuisances and causes of
sickness within the town); Albany v. Newhof, 230 App. Div. 687, 246 N. Y. Supp.
100 (1930) (ordinance upheld prohibiting slaughtering of cattle in buildings within
certain prescribed territory without permission of the common council); Yee Bow
v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio St. 269, 124 N. E. 132 (1919) (health commissioner properly
allowed to decide on "adequate" ventilation and plumbing of laundries) ; Lerner v.
City of Delavan, 203 Wis. 32, 233 N. W. 608 (1930) (ordinance valid forbidding the
keeping of a junk yard without a permit from city council).
"WEBSTER, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (Unabridged) (2d ed. 1949) d e f i n e s
"decibel" as follows: "One tenth of a bel. The decibel is the usual unit for measuring
the loudness of sounds. It is equivalent to the loss in power in a mile of standard
cable at 860 cycles."
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To meet the requirements of the Court in the Said case, the ordinance
would have to specify exact times and places when loud-speaking devices
could be used. This, in effect, would bring forth the very danger which
the Court is endeavoring to prevent, since it would be impossible for the
Legislature to anticipate all the situations that would present themselves,
were no deviations or exceptions permitted from the narrowly drawn
regulation. Such legislation would continue to act as unnecessary sup-
pression of freedom of speech and religion in some instances.
In assuming that loud-speaking devices come within freedom of
speech as contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, the Court
dearly contradicts itself in requiring a narrowly drawn ordinance. In
litigation over what is a violation of freedom of speech, the Supreme
Court itself has never been able to set standards for its own decisions
on this matter, and in recent opinions is further away from a test
embodying any reasonable certainty.
5 2
In view of the fact that sound, as well as all nuisances, is a nebulous
thing, some discretion must be granted to administrative officers in
determining when a given situation becomes a nuisance. Although
ordinances or statutes can, and therefore should, be more definite than
the Lockport ordinance, it is impossible to attain the exactitude
that the Court seemingly requires. Admittedly the answer does not
lie in permitting wide discretionary power to be vested in one minor
official, who may use it as an instrument of oppression; but neither does
it lie in forbidding the citizens to protect themselves against disagreeable
and unwanted noise and congestion.
An expeditious method of minimizing this possibility, while retaining
the flexibility required in the regulation of nuisances, would be to pre-
scribe a hearing on each application for a permit. A duly constituted
board would then decide whether or not the applicant's action invades
privacy to such a degree that the community's interests would materially
outweigh the individual's right to use the loud-speaker. The American
"12Tucker v. Texas, 326 U. S. 517 (1946); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501 (1946);
Foilet v. Town of McCormick, 321 U. S. 573 (1944); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U. S. 158 (1944) ; West Virginia State Board of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943) ;
Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U. S. 157 (1943) ; Martin v. City of Struthers, 319
U. S. 141 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 (1943); Jamison v. Texas
318 U. S. 413 (1943) ; Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U. S. 584 (1942).
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